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This paper develops a moral hazard model whereby an agent exerts
power to impute failure to other agents. The model is used to analyze the
eﬀect of power on organizational welfare. Our conclusion is that power
is beneﬁcial for organizations if the principal can control the power rela-
tionships between agents. These beneﬁts disappear if strategic interaction
between agents determines the power relationship. Other kinds of bene-
ﬁts are also shown by extending the model in two directions: (i) where
there is competition for power between agents, and (ii) where the strategic
interaction between agents generates a direct negative externality for the
organization.
1 Introduction
Power, the ability of a person to bargain advantageously with his or her col-
leagues, is commonly observed in organizations. Researchers in organizational
behavior have long investigated horizontal power relationships (i.e., between col-
leagues, divisional managers, etc.) and have conﬁrmed the existence of power
(Boeker, 1989; Crozier, 1964; Emerson, 1962; Gandz and Murray, 1980; Salan-
cik and Pfeﬀer, 1974; Perrow, 1986. For a recent survey paper, see Ocasio,
2002). For example, Crozier (1964) in a case study of three French factories,
found that maintenance workers (e.g., machine-setters and ordinary mechanics)
exerted their power on production workers.1 Although maintenance workers
do not have (formal) authority over production workers, one of the production
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1workers reports that “we are dependent on them (maintenance workers), they
are the bosses” (p.93). Salancik and Pfeﬀer (1974) also oﬀer empirical evidence
for the existence of power among faculty heads at the University of Illinois. Al-
though various organizational processes are inﬂuenced by power, the evaluation
process itself is the one that is most susceptible to power. Gandz and Murray
(1980) asked the respondents of their survey research to give “a good example
of workplace politics in action.”2 Thirty-one percent of the examples given were
associated with the assessment of work performance, such as those that “dealt
with avoiding blame for poor work performance.”
The main purpose of this paper is to analyze the eﬀects of power on organi-
zational welfare when power is exerted in the evaluation processes as in Gandz
and Murray (1980). One may think that as this is likely to distort performance
measures, power provides only negative eﬀects for organizations. This paper,
however, argues that under some conditions, power is beneﬁcial for organiza-
tions. To address this issue, we develop a variant of a standard moral hazard
model with limited liability in which there is a risk-neutral headquarters (the
principal) and two identical risk-neutral division managers (the agents). Each
division manager chooses whether to take productive action, and the head-
quarters designs and oﬀers each manager a compensation scheme for taking
productive action. The performance of each manager is separately evaluated as
either “good” or “bad”, but is correlated with that of the other manager. For
convenience, the outcome where a manager’s performance is good and the other
manager’s performance is bad is labeled as the former’s relative success. The
managers also choose whether to engage in unproductive activity named “power
struggle.” Their choice of power struggle determines the power relationship be-
tween the managers, and the power relationship inﬂuences their performance
measures as follows. If only one of the managers engages in the power struggle,
he acquires power and can impute, in part, his failure to the nonpowerful man-
ager. In other words, the emergence of power increases the probability of the
powerful manager’s relative success and decreases the nonpowerful manager’s
relative success. If both or neither manager engages in the power struggle, no
manager has power and the performance measures are not distorted.
We examine this model under the following alternative assumptions: (a) the
power struggle is contractable (a contractable power acquisition process), or
(b) the power struggle is not contractable (a noncontractable power acquisition
process). The ﬁrst assumption means that the headquarters can control the
power relationship, while the second assumption suggests that the strategic
interaction between the managers determines the power relationship. These
assumptions may be interpreted as representing the following realistic cases.
Suppose that the main source of power is the ability to inﬂuence the allocation
of critical resources such as information, key machinery, monetary budgets,
etc.3 When the critical resources are owned by the organization, assumption
2Gandz and Murray (1980) sent 590 questionnaires to the North American resident grad-
uates and current part-time MBA students of a large metropolitan Canadian business school.
The respondents were asked the extent to which political considerations inﬂuenced 11 or-
ganizational processes, including pay determination, promotion and discipline, and asked to
describe an actual situation as “a good example of workplace politics in action.” They found
that interdepartmental coordination, the delegation of authority, and promotion are the most
politicized.
3For example, Salancik and Pfeﬀer (1974) ﬁnd that the power of a department head in the
university is most highly correlated with the outside funds that the department obtains.
2(a) is reasonable, as the headquarters can usually allocate resources between
the managers and this makes possible the headquarters’ control over the power
relationship. On the other hand, assumption (b) applies when the resources do
not belong to the organization, such as outside research funding for a university.
Although this paper shows the optimality of power in both cases, the beneﬁts
are quite diﬀerent as brieﬂy explained below.
Start by assuming that the power acquisition process is contractable. In this
case, the beneﬁt of power is that it reduces the rents the headquarters must pay
to the managers below that where there is no emergence of power. When no
manager has power, performance measures are not distorted, and hence as in the
standard moral hazard model with limited liability and correlated performance,
the least costly contract speciﬁes a high compensation to a manager if and only
if he is relatively successful (Che and Yoo, 2001).4 When the powerful manager
can impute failure to the nonpowerful manager, there are two kinds of change
in the probability distribution of performance measures. On the one hand, the
probability of the nonpowerful manager’s relative success decreases. When the
compensation to the nonpowerful manager is contingent on relative success,
the decrease in probability reduces the rent paid to the nonpowerful manager
because his or her performance is less likely to be good. On the other hand,
the powerful manager’s exertion of power also increases the probability of his
or her own relative success. If the compensation to the powerful manager were
contingent on his or her relative success, this would increase the rent paid to the
powerful manager. The headquarters, however, can avoid this increase in the
rent paid by changing the pay scheme so that the powerful manager is paid high
compensation if and only if both managers’ performance measures are good.
Therefore, the headquarters prefers the emergence of power.
When the power acquisition process is not contractable, the headquarters
must design the contract in order to control both productive activities and
power struggles. The optimal contract under the contractable power acquisition
process then turns out to be infeasible because it cannot induce the emergence
of power. We show that under the noncontractable power acquisition process,
power is never optimal, and the optimal contract is either that both or nei-
ther manager engages in a power struggle, depending on the cost of the power
struggle.
We thus extend the model in two directions in order to ﬁnd the beneﬁts of
power under the noncontractable power acquisition process. The ﬁrst extension
is to introduce competition for resources between the managers. In the basic
model, we implicitly assume that each manager can establish his or her inﬂuence
on resources at the same cost, regardless of the other manager’s behavior. This
assumption may be reasonable when there are abundant resources such that
resource constraints are not binding. On the other hand, if resources are scarce,
and both managers attempt to establish an inﬂuence on them, the managers
must engage in competition for the resources. Then it is reasonable to assume
that each manager bears a greater cost in establishing his or her inﬂuence when
the other manager also engages in the power struggle than when the latter does
not. Under such a modiﬁed cost function, we show that power is again beneﬁcial
to the organization, because headquarters can more easily control the managers’
4The headquarters cannot avoid leaving the managers with rents, because the principal
cannot verify their productive action and the agents are protected by limited liability.
3power struggle under the emergence of power.
In the second extension, we consider the direct negative eﬀect of the power
struggle on the eﬃciency of organizations. This contrasts with the basic model
where the power struggle only aﬀects performance measures. Suppose that by
engaging in a power struggle, each manager can establish his or her control
over the use of resources, and hence the other manager has to bargain with the
former in order to use these same resources. This sort of bargaining can cause
negative externalities for the organization, including the delaying of decisions,
the breakdown of the bargaining process, and so on. When there is a negative
externality, headquarters faces a trade-oﬀ between allowing the power strug-
gle that results in the negative externality and preventing the power struggle
with some additional incentive costs. Therefore, we show that if the negative
externality is not large, power is again optimal.
There is some existing literature studying nonproductive activities such as
our power struggle. Milgrom and Roberts (1986) and Milgrom (1988) intro-
duce “inﬂuence activities,” whereby managers inﬂuence the decisions of their
headquarters. With this process, they claim that the headquarters’ welfare is
worsened because it is more costly for the headquarters to induce the managers’
productive activities when they have incentives for engaging in inﬂuence activ-
ities. Scharfstein and Stein (2000) consider rent-seeking activities by managers
and show that the possibility of such activities leads to the ineﬃcient alloca-
tion of investment, even if the headquarters can use compensation schemes to
prevent them. Power struggle in our model may be interpreted as an example
of inﬂuence activity, in the sense that performance measurement is aﬀected.
Lazear (1989) and Chen (2003) analyze “sabotage” in rank-order tournament
models, whereby one manager aims to hurt another manager’s performance. In
that model, sabotage only distorts the performance of the other manager; in
our model, the powerful manager not only decreases the nonpowerful manager’s
performance, but also increases his or her own performance.
The most distinctive contribution of the current paper is to show the op-
timality of power. None of the extant literature identiﬁes the case where the
allowance for nonproductive activities is optimal for the principal. Indeed, the
existing work argues that the principal should prohibit nonproductive activities
if he or she can write a contract contingent on these activities. In contrast, we
show that headquarters prefers the emergence of power, even if it can prevent
managers from engaging in nonproductive activities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the
moral hazard model and introduces power struggle. In section 3, we show that
power is beneﬁcial for the headquarters when the power acquisition process is
contractable. Section 4 analyzes the case of a noncontractable power acquisition
process. We oﬀer two extensions to explain further beneﬁts of power in section
5. Section 6 provides some concluding remarks.
2 Framework
We consider a moral hazard model with limited liability in a ﬁrm with a head-
quarters and two divisions. The headquarters is managed by a principal, and
each division by a distinct division manager i (i = 1;2). All three parties are
assumed to be risk neutral.
4Contract The principal designs and oﬀers each manager a contract that con-
sists of a compensation scheme based on each pair of the managers’ performance
outcomes. Each manager’s performance is measured as either “good” (G) or
“bad” (B). Each pair of the managers’ performance outcomes belongs to the
feasible outcome set denoted by X = fGG;GB;BG;BBg, where the ﬁrst com-
ponent of each element is manager 1’s performance outcome and the second is
manager 2’s. For example, when the principal observes GB, manager 1’s per-
formance outcome is good and manager 2’s is bad. The compensation scheme
is denoted by w = (wi(x);x 2 X;i 2 f1;2g), where wi(x) is the compensation
to manager i when a pair of the performance outcomes is x 2 X. We call
w1 = (w1(x);x 2 X) joint performance evaluation (JPE) if w1(GG) ¸ w1(GB)
and w1(BG) ¸ w1(BB). w1 represents relative performance evaluation (RPE)
if w1(GG) · w1(GB) and w1(BG) · w1(BB).5 We restrict attention to the
contract satisfying the limited liability constraints (that is, wi(x) ¸ 0 for any
x 2 X), which imply that the managers can leave the relationship at any time,
or they are wealth constrained.
Productive Actions The managers simultaneously choose productive ac-
tions for the headquarters. Manager i’s productive action denoted by ei 2
E = feH;eLg is not veriﬁable. He incurs private cost c(eH) = c > 0 if he takes
action eH, while action eL costs zero (c(eL) = 0).
The managers’ productive action pair, (e1;e2), aﬀects the distribution func-
tion of the performance outcome as follows.6 There is a common circumstance
that is desirable with strictly positive probability ¾ and undesirable with prob-
ability 1 ¡ ¾. If the circumstance is desirable, the performance outcomes of
both managers are good; that is, x = GG, regardless of the managers’ action.
If the circumstance is undesirable, a manager’s performance outcome is good
with probability qk and bad with probability 1 ¡ qk when the manager exerts
action ek. We assume qH > qL. We also assume qH > 1=2 for avoiding any un-
necessary classiﬁcation of the optimal compensation. Dropping this assumption
does not essentially change the results. Table 1 summarizes the joint probabil-
ity distribution. We interpret ¾ as the degree of positive correlation between
two divisions, because larger ¾ implies more positive correlation between their
performances.
Table 1: The joint distribution function at (e1;e2) = (ej;ek)
M 2
G B
M 1 G ¾ + (1 ¡ ¾)qjqk (1 ¡ ¾)qj(1 ¡ qk)
B (1 ¡ ¾)(1 ¡ qj)qk (1 ¡ ¾)(1 ¡ qj)(1 ¡ qk)
5We can similarly deﬁne JPE and RPE about w2 = (w2(x);x 2 X).
6This distribution function follows Che and Yoo (2001). It has two characteristics: (i)
technological independence, and (ii) positive correlation of performance measure. (ii) implies
that it is easier for both managers to obtain good performance when circumstances are good
(e.g., when demand in the product market is growing) than when it is bad (e.g., when product
demand is shrinking).
5Power Struggle Game Besides productive activities, the manager decides
whether or not to engage in a power struggle. Formally he or she chooses bi from
B = fbH;bLg, where bH means that he or she engages in the power struggle
and bL represents the decision of no struggle. A cost function, d(bi), satisﬁes
d(bH) = d > 0 and d(bH) = 0.
As discussed earlier, the managers’ struggle determines a power relationship
between the managers. When only one manager engages in the power struggle,
he or she can persuade the other manager to follow what the former wants. We
say manager 1 (manager 2) has power if (b1;b2) = (bH;bL) ((b1;b2) = (bL;bH)),
respectively. When both or neither manager engages in the power struggle,
power is not generated because the manager’s relative position does not change.
The power relationship is classiﬁed into three cases based on the managers’
struggle decision: (i) a struggle-proof situation (SP), where neither manager
engages in the power struggle; (ii) a struggle-accepted situation (SA), where
both managers engage in the power struggle, and (iii) a powerful i situation
(PWi), where only manager i engages in the power struggle.
Power enables the holder to manipulate performance measures in the follow-
ing way. If both or neither manager struggles for power (b1 = b2), the probability
function of the performance measure is the same as Table 1. If only manager
1 struggles for power ((b1;b2) = (bH;bL)), the probability of the powerful man-
ager’s relative success (outcome pair GB) increases by ¯ and the probability of
the nonpowerful manager’s relative success (BG) decreases by ¯ as in Table 2.7
We assume that ¯ satisﬁes
0 < ¯ < (1 ¡ ¾)qL(1 ¡ qH); (1)
so that the probability of each performance outcome is positive for all (ej;ek).
Intuitively, the powerful manager can impute his or her failure to the nonpow-
erful manager. In other words, the powerful manager manipulates his or her
own performance measure at the expense of the nonpowerful manager’s measure
when power is generated.




M 1 G ¾ + (1 ¡ ¾)qjqk (1 ¡ ¾)qj(1 ¡ qk) + ¯
B (1 ¡ ¾)(1 ¡ qj)qk ¡ ¯ (1 ¡ ¾)(1 ¡ qj)(1 ¡ qk)
An interpretation of this formulation is that there is “ambiguity” about
performance. Ambiguity means that the principal cannot always specify who
is responsible for relative success in the project, either GB or BG. Given
that true performance is GB or BG, the headquarters can verify who is the
responsible manager for the relative success in the project with probability
(1 ¡ ¾)(1 ¡ qj)qk ¡ ¯. However, with probability ¯, the headquarters can-
not observe who is responsible, and thus the performance measure is open for
7We can similarly deﬁne the probability distribution under (b1;b2) = (bL;bH).
6managerial manipulation. In the latter case, the performance depends on the
power relation between the managers. For example, performance may be eval-
uated in a formal meeting of two division managers and their headquarters. If
the document submitted to the meeting aﬀords abundant evidence, power does
not matter. Otherwise, power plays an important role in evaluation. We can
then interpret ¯ as the degree of ambiguity concerning performance. Gandz and
Murray (1980) oﬀer empirical support for ambiguity in performance measures.
Payoﬀs and Timing Finally, we deﬁne some notation for simplicity. The
probability of a pair of performance outcomes x 2 fGG;GB;BG;BBg is de-
noted by ps
jk(x), where manager 1 (manager 2) takes ej (ek) and s (s 2 fS;PW1;
PW2g) is an indicator of the power relationship, where s = S represents the
situation in which no manager has power; i.e., SP or SA. When manager i has
power, the situation is denoted by s = PWi.














U1(ej;ek;bn;bm;w) = EP1(w) ¡ c(ej) ¡ d(bn)
U2(ej;ek;bn;bm;w) = EP2(w) ¡ c(ek) ¡ d(bm)
Because the managers are perfectly symmetrical, without loss of generality, we
call situation s = PW1 the emergence of power and denote it by s = PW:
situation s = PW2 can be analyzed similarly. We assume that the principal’s
beneﬁt with performance is so large that he or she always wishes to induce high
productive action eH for both managers and thus focuses on the minimization
of EP(w). The timing of the game is as follows.
1. The principal oﬀers a contract to the managers.
2. The managers simultaneously decide whether or not to accept the con-
tract. If both managers accept, the game continues to the next stage.
Otherwise, the game ends and all parties receive zero.
3. The managers simultaneously choose productive actions and power strug-
gles.
4. A pair of performance outcomes is realized, and the managers are paid
according to the terms of the contract.
3 The Contractable Power Acquisition Process
In this section, we consider the beneﬁt of power under the assumption that the
managers’ struggle for power is contractable. This assumption can be justiﬁed
in the following two cases. The ﬁrst case is where headquarters can prohibit the
managers from acquiring resources outside the organization. When a source of
power is inﬂuence with persons in charge of distribution chains, headquarters can
prohibit managers from meeting them. The second case is where an allocation
of the resources in the organization primarily changes the power relationship
7between managers. If the principal can verify who controls the resources, he
or she can prohibit or allow the managers’ power struggle at will, because the
undesired manager’s control for the resources can be excluded with adequate
punishment.8
When the struggles are contractable, the principal has two control variables
for his or her optimization; that is, a compensation scheme and whether or not
to allow the managers to engage in the struggle. The principal’s optimization




s:t Ui(eH;eH;bm;bn;wi) ¸ 0 i = 1;2 (PCi)
U1(eH;eH;bm;bn;w1) ¸ U1(eL;eH;bm;bn;w1) (IC1)
U2(eH;eH;bm;bn;w2) ¸ U2(eH;eL;bm;bn;w2) (IC2)
wi(x) ¸ 0 8x 2 X; i = 1;2 (LLC)
The manager i’ participation constraint (PCi) implies that he must obtain
at least his or her reservation utility, which we normalize to zero. The limited
liability constraint (LLC) comes from the fact that the manager can leave the
contract at any time. The manager i’s incentive compatibility constraint (ICi)
is imposed on the problem in order to induce the desirable productive action
(eH).
Before fully solving the above problem, we ﬁrst obtain the benchmark solu-
tion in the struggle-free situation in which no struggle is allowed and hence the
principal faces only the moral hazard problem. By manipulating, (ICi) yields
qH(w1(GG) ¡ w1(BG)) + (1 ¡ qH)(w1(GB) ¡ w1(BB)) ¸ Ie; (IC1’)




(1 ¡ ¾)(qH ¡ qL)
:
Ie is the expected compensation diﬀerence that is required to induce the de-
sirable productive action. Notice that the principal can use either joint per-
formance evaluation (JPE) or relative performance evaluation (RPE) to induce
the desirable productive action. In fact, by inequality (IC1’), either increment
of w1
GG or increment of w1
GB gives manager 1 the incentive for taking produc-
tive action. The optimal compensation therefore depends on which evaluation
process, JPE or RPE, more eﬀectively utilizes the information of performance
outcome. The following proposition claims that RPE is more informative in our
model.
Proposition 1 (Struggle-Free Solution). Suppose that there are no struggles
for power. The following symmetrical compensation scheme w¤ = (w1
¤;w2
¤) is
8Even if the principal’s punishment is constrained by the limited liability of the managers,
the incentive for deviation vanishes. While deviation induces zero utility for the manager,
which is the maximum punishment possible under a limited liability constraint, the managers
obtain positive utility by following the principal’s order because of participation constraints.
8uniquely optimal.




w1(x) = 0 for x 6= GB; w2(x) = 0 for x 6= BG:
The principal’s expected payment is given as EP(w¤) = 2qHc=(qH ¡ qL).
Proof. The principal controls only w. In an optimal compensation scheme,
w1(BG) and w1(BB) should be equal to zero as positive w1(BG) and w1(BB)
increase the principal’s payment without relaxing (IC1). Substituting the bind-




c + ¾w1(GG): (2)
As ¾ is positive and the manager is protected by the limited liability constraints,
w1(GG) should be also equal to zero. From the binding (IC1), w1(GB) =
Ie=(1¡qH). The optimal compensation for manager 2 is similarly obtained.
As w1(BB) = w1(BG) = 0, the optimality of RPE is easily understood by












(1 ¡ ¾)qL(1 ¡ qH)qL
> 0: (3)
This means that the performance outcome GG is less informative than GB.
When the principal observes the performance GB, he or she expects that it
is likely for manager 1 to take eH. However, GG does not only reﬂect the
managers’ productive actions. When he or she observes GG, there is another
possibility with probability ¾ that the circumstance is desirable. This is why
the principal should use the extreme RPE.
The business similarity among the managers (¾) plays an important role
in designing compensation schemes. If the correlation is zero, RPE and JPE
are indiﬀerent. Moreover, the optimal compensation scheme does not have to
depend on the other manager’s performance. This result is familiar from the
work of Holmstrom (1982), Mookherjee (1984) and, in particular, Che and Yoo
(2001).
We next consider the moral hazard model with the managers’ struggle and
the claim that power beneﬁts the principal. To show the optimality of power, all
we have to do is to compare the implementation cost in PW (in which power is
generated in organizations) with that in the struggle-free situation, because the
principal weakly prefers the struggle-free situation to SP and SA (in which no
manager has power). This is obtained by Lemma 2 in the appendix. We deﬁne
an indicator as L(¾;¯) to compare the informativeness of GB with that of GG












qH¯(1 ¡ ¾)(qH ¡ qL)[L(¾;¯) ¡ 1]
(¾ + (1 ¡ ¾)qLqH)(¯ + (1 ¡ ¾)qL(1 ¡ qH))
;
where L(¾;¯) = (1 ¡ qH)¾=qH¯. As all parts in the equation, except for the
L(¾;¯) ¡ 1, are positive, GG is more informative than GB under PW if and
only if L(¾;¯) < 1.
9We begin with the explanation of the eﬀect that the distortion of performance
measure has on the informativeness of the performance outcome. GB, which
is used for the powerful manager’s productive activity, is noisier under PW
than in the struggle-free situation, while BG, which reﬂects the nonpowerful






















Given the struggle-free solution w¤, the distortion changes only the distribu-
tion of the rent. The powerful manager obtains more rent and the nonpowerful
manager obtains less rent, because under the distorted performance measure,
GB is more likely to occur and BG is less likely. The implementation cost is







+ ¯[w1(GB) + w2(GB)] ¡ ¯[w1(BG) + w2(BG)]:
(5)
The ﬁrst term is equal to the expected payment in the struggle-free situa-
tion. The second and third terms are the additional payment due to the dis-
torted change of performance measures. As the information gain (¯[w2(BG) +
w1(BG)]) and the information loss (¯[w1(GB)+w2(GB)]) are exactly canceled
out (i.e., w1(GB) = w2(BG) and w1(BG) = w2(GB)), the principal achieves
the same implementation cost EP(w¤) as in the struggle-free situation even if
the principal faces power.
Is the struggle-free solution optimal under PW? The answer is no. Gener-
ating power in organizations, the principal can design a better compensation
scheme to recover part of the powerful manager’s rent. Consider the compen-
sation scheme such that the principal pays high compensation to the power-
ful manager 1 only if performance is GG (i.e., w1(GG) = Ie=qH, w1(GB) =
w1(BG) = w1(BB) = 0) and the nonpowerful manager is paid in the same
way as the struggle-free solution. In other words, the principal imposes on
the powerful manager responsibility for the nonpowerful manager’s failure. In
comparison with w¤, the new scheme makes the sum of the second term and
the third term in (5) negative, because the principal uses more informative BG
while he or she does not use less informative GB (inequality (4)). This is a
beneﬁt for the principal. However, the principal also bears the cost (the ﬁrst
term increases) as GG is less informative than GB in the struggle-free situation
(inequality (3)). Power is thus optimal if the information gain of BG exceeds
the information loss of GG. This condition is equivalent to the condition that
GG is more informative than the distorted GB under PW, i.e., L(¾;¯) < 1, as
the information gain of BG is exactly canceled out by the information loss of
GB under PW (equation (5)).
Proposition 2. Suppose that the power acquisition process is contractable and
manager 1 has power under PW.
1. If 0 · L(¾;¯) < 1 and d 2 [0;qLc=(qH ¡ qL) + ¯Ie=(1 ¡ qH)), then power
is optimal. The optimal compensation scheme w¤¤ is asymmetrical; that
10is,







w1(x) = F for x 6= GG; w2(x) = 0 for x 6= BG;
where F = maxf0;d¡qLc=(qH ¡qL)¡¾Ie=(1¡qH)g for satisfying (PC1).
The principal’s expected payment are given as
EP(w¤¤) = EP(w¤) ¡
¯
(1 ¡ qH)
(1 ¡ L(¾;¯))Ie + F:
2. Otherwise, the principal weakly prefers no power struggle. The optimal
compensation scheme and the implementation cost are the same as the
struggle-freeness.
Proof. We derive an optimal compensation scheme under PW.
1. 0 · L(¾;¯) < 1
Suppose that d 2 (0;qLc=(qH ¡ qL) + ¾Ie=(1 ¡ qH)] and thus F = 0.
Substituting (ICi), the objective function yields












where w1(BB) = w1(BG) = w2(GB) = w2(BB) = 0 by the same rea-
soning as in the struggle-free situation. We can show w1(GB) = 0 and
w2(BG) > 0 as the coeﬃcient of w1(GB) is positive and the coeﬃcient of
w2(BG) is negative from L(¾;¯) < 1. From (LLC) and (ICi), then the








Ie ¡ d ¸ 0;




As d 2 [0;qLc=(qH¡qL)+¾Ie=(1¡qH)] holds, both managers’ participation
constraints are not binding under w¤¤. The implementation cost is




This shows that the implementation cost is smaller than that in the
struggle-free situation, as 0 · L(¾;¯) < 1.
When d 2 [qLc=(qH ¡ qL) + ¾Ie=(1 ¡ qH);1), (PC1) is not satisﬁed and
thus the principal must pay more to powerful manager 1 to satisfy (PC1).
One of the optimal schemes is that the principal pays ﬁxed compensation
F = d¡qLc=(qH ¡qL)¡¾Ie=(1¡qH) to manager 1. The implementation
cost under PW is EP(w¤¤) = EP(w¤) ¡ ¯(1 ¡ L(¾;¯))Ie=(1 ¡ qH) + F.
Therefore, the implementation cost is smaller than that in the struggle-free
situation if d 2 [qLc=(qH¡qL)+¾Ie=(1¡qH);qLc=(qH¡qL)+¯Ie=(1¡qH)).
112. 1 · L(¾;¯)
As the coeﬃcients of both w1(GB) and w2(BG) in (6) are positive, we can
show that when we ignore (PCi), w¤ is an optimal compensation scheme
and the implementation cost under PW is the same as that in struggle-
freeness. Furthermore, when d 2 (qLc=(qH ¡qL)+¯Ie=(1¡qH);1) holds,
the principal must pay more compensation to the powerful manager 1 to
satisfy (PC1) and thus the principal weakly prefers no power.
Corollary 1. Suppose that the power acquisition process is contractable. As ¯
becomes larger, the implementation cost EP(w¤¤) becomes smaller.
The more ambiguous the performance measure (the larger ¯ is), the greater
the rent-reduction. (5) implies that BG becomes more informative as the per-
formance measure is more ambiguous, as BG is less likely to occur in PW. This
enhances the beneﬁt of power.
Corollary 2. Suppose that the power acquisition process is contractable. As ¾
becomes smaller, the implementation cost EP(w¤¤) also becomes smaller .
As the business becomes less similar (¾ is smaller), the principal reduces
rent more as GG becomes more informative and the cost of power decreases. If
¾ = 0, the ﬁrst condition in the proposition is always satisﬁed, i.e., L(0;¯) = 0,
and hence power is optimal.
4 Noncontractable Power Acquisition Process
When the manager’s struggles for power are not contractable, the principal can-
not indirectly control the power relationship between managers. The principal,
however, can adjust the incentive for power struggle through the compensation
scheme and thus indirectly controls the power relationship.
The struggle-proof situation (namely, SP), where no manager is induced
to engage in power struggle on equilibrium, can be achieved by the scheme
satisfying the following conditions in addition to (PCi), (ICi), and (LLC).
U1(e1;e2;bL;bL) ¸ U1(e1;e2;bH;bL)
U2(e1;e2;bL;bL) ¸ U2(e1;e2;bL;bH)
The condition implies that each manager’s utility is lower when he or she engages
in the power struggle than when he or she does not, given that the other manager
does not engage. The conditions are rewritten as
¯(w1(GB) ¡ w1(BG)) · d; (SPC1)
¯(w2(BG) ¡ w2(GB)) · d: (SPC2)
The left-hand side is the beneﬁt of struggle for power, which stems from the fact
that the powerful manager can impute his failure to the nonpowerful manager
and the right-hand side is its cost. The conditions for the struggle-accepted
situation (namely, SA), where both managers engage in power struggle, are
¯(w1(GB) ¡ w1(BG)) ¸ d; (SAC1)
¯(w2(BG) ¡ w2(GB)) ¸ d; (SAC2)
12and the conditions for the emergence of power (namely, PW) are
¯(w1(GB) ¡ w1(BG)) ¸ d; (PWC1)
¯(w2(BG) ¡ w2(GB)) · d: (PWC2)
The principal chooses the power relationship, anticipating the implementa-
tion cost in each situation. Let wSP, wSA, and wPW be the optimal compensa-
tion scheme conditioned on SP, SA, and PW, respectively. For example, wSP is
the solution to [problem 1] with struggle-proof conditions, (SPC1) and (SPC2),
added.
When the power acquisition process is noncontractable, these constraints for
the indirect control of the power relationship make the compensation scheme in
proposition 2 infeasible. Furthermore, it turns out that the principal will not
prefer power in organizations as shown below. Suppose 0 · L(¾;¯) · 1, in
which under the contractable power acquisition process the emergence of power
is optimal and the optimal compensation scheme is w¤¤. Under the optimal
compensation scheme w¤¤, ¯[w1(GB) + w2(GB)] ¡ ¯[w1(BG) + w2(BG)] in
equation (5) must be strictly negative. However, it must be nonnegative as
(PWC1) and (PWC2) imply
w1(GB) ¡ w1(BG) ¸
d
¯
¸ w2(BG) ¡ w2(GB):
Hence w¤¤ is infeasible. Moreover, the implementation cost in PW is larger
than that in struggle-free situation, except at d = ¯Ie=(1 ¡ qH), because w¤,
under which the principal achieves the same implementation cost as that in the
struggle-free situation, is also infeasible. Substituting w¤, (PWC1) and (PWC2)
yield
U1(e1;e2;bH;bL;w¤) ¡ U1(e1;e2;bL;bL;w¤) = ¯
Ie
(1 ¡ qH)
¡ d ¸ 0;
U2(e1;e2;bH;bH;w¤) ¡ U2(e1;e2;bH;bL;w¤) = ¯
Ie
(1 ¡ qH)
¡ d · 0:
These inequalities show that either (PWC1) or (PWC2) is not satisﬁed, ex-
cept at d = ¯Ie=(1 ¡ qH), and hence the principal cannot eﬀectively use the
information of performance measure.
Proposition 3. Suppose that the power acquisition process is not contractable.
Power is not optimal for the principal. The optimal solution is given as follows.
1. For d 2 [0;¯Ie=(1 ¡ qH)), the principal strictly prefers SA (struggle-
accepted situation).
2. For d = ¯Ie=(1 ¡ qH), all situations are indiﬀerent to the principal.
3. For d 2 (¯Ie=(1¡qH);1), the principal strictly prefers SP (struggle-proof
situation).
In every case, the optimal compensation scheme is w¤ and the implementation
cost is EP(w¤) = 2qHc=(qH ¡ qL).
13Proof. We prove here that
EP(wSA) = EP(w¤) < EP(wSP) for d 2 [0;¯Ie=(1 ¡ qH)); (7)
EP(wSA) = EP(w¤) = EP(wSP) for d = ¯Ie=(1 ¡ qH); (8)
EP(wSA) > EP(w¤) = EP(wSP) for d 2 (¯Ie=(1 ¡ qH);1): (9)
We have already shown that EP(w¤) < EP(wPW) when d 6= ¯Ie=(1 ¡ qH).
Combining these inequalities, we complete the proof.
Suppose d 2 [0;¯Ie=(1¡qH)). Recall that the unique optimal compensation
in the struggle-free situation, which is the solution to problem 1, is w¤. This w¤




EP(wSA) = EP(w¤) thus holds. However, EP(wSP) > EP(w¤) as w¤ is a
unique solution in the optimization problem and w¤ does not satisfy (SPC1)
and (SPC2). Therefore, EP(wSA) = EP(w¤) < EP(wSP). For d 2 [¯Ie=(1 ¡
qH);1], it is similarly obtained that EP(wSA) > EP(w¤) = EP(wSA). At
d = ¯Ie=(1 ¡ qH), EP(wSA) = EP(w¤) = EP(wSA) as w¤ satisﬁes (SPC1),
(SPC2), (SAC1), and (SAC2).
The above represents the trade-oﬀ between the eﬀective use of information
on productive activity and an adjustment for the manager’s incentive to struggle
for power. In SP and SA, w¤ is the compensation scheme by which the principal
makes the most of information on the managers’ productive activities. If the
power struggle cost is small (d 2 [0;¯Ie=(1 ¡ qH))), the principal cannot eﬀec-
tively use information on the performance measure under SP, as w¤ induces the
agents to engage in the power struggle (w¤ violates (SPC1) and (SPC2)). On
the other hand, the principal can eﬀectively use the information, as w¤ satisﬁes
(SAC1) and (SAC2). SA is thus optimal. If the power struggle cost is large
(d 2 (¯Ie=(1 ¡ qH);1)), SP is optimal, as the managers are not suﬃciently
given the incentive for a power struggle under w¤.
5 Extensions
In the previous section, we have shown that the beneﬁts described in proposition
2 become infeasible under the noncontractable power acquisition process. By
extending the model, however, we ﬁnd other beneﬁts of power. In this section,
we assume 1 < L(¾;¯) so as to focus on the other beneﬁts of power.9 For
convenience, we denote the manager’s incentive for the power struggle under
the struggle-free solution, w¤, by




9When this condition does not hold, the principal again obtains the beneﬁt from distortion
of performance under the extended model. This assumption thus excludes the beneﬁt from
the distortion of performance discussed in section 3.
145.1 Resource Competition
The ﬁrst extension considers the resource competition between the managers.
So far, we have assumed that a manager can establish his or her inﬂuence on
resources at the same cost, regardless of the other manager’s behavior. This
assumption applies when there are suﬃcient or plentiful resources. If resources
are scarce, and both managers attempt to establish an inﬂuence on them, the
managers engage in competition for the resources. A manager then bears a
greater cost to establish his or her inﬂuence on the resources when both man-





d + h if (b1;b2) = (bH;bH)







d + h if (b1;b2) = (bH;bH)
d if (b1;b2) = (bL;bH)
0 otherwise
; (11)
where h (> 0) is the additional cost from the competition and d1(b1;b2) and
d2(b1;b2) are manager 1’s cost and manager 2’s cost, respectively.
Given the managers’ struggle situation (i.e., SP, SA or PW), the optimal
compensation scheme and the expected payment are obtained by a standard
procedure (see Appendix B). Let d1 =
¯Ie
1¡qH ¡ h and d2 =
¯Ie
1¡qH .
Lemma 1. Suppose that the power acquisition process is noncontractable, man-
ager 1 has power under PW, there is competition for resources, and 1 < L(¾;¯).
Given the managers’ struggle situation, the optimal compensation scheme and
expected payment are given as follows.













if d 2 (0;d2)





EP(w¤) + 2L(¾;¯)Ip if d 2 (0;d2)
EP(w¤) if d 2 [d2;1) : (13)
2. Given SA (struggle-accepted situation),
wSA =
(













EP(w¤) if d 2 (0;d1)
2
(1¡¾)qH(1¡qH)(d+h)
¯ if d 2 [d1;1)
: (15)










qH¯ (Ip ¡ h); d+h
¯ ;0;0
´´
if d 2 (0;d1)













EP(w¤) + (L(¾;¯) + 1)(Ip ¡ h) if d 2 (0;d1)






(¡Ip) if d 2 [d2;1)
:
(17)
Lemma 1 at h = 0 shows the optimal implementation cost in each situation
before modiﬁcation of the cost function. The implementation cost is drawn in
the following ﬁgure 1. Power is not optimal, except at d = d2. SA is optimal if















Figure 1: The implementation cost in each situation when h = 0
(¯ = 0:1, ¾ = 0:03, qH = 0:6, qL = 0:3, and c = 2)
The following ﬁgure 2 shows the implementation cost if there is competition
for resources (h > 0). For the same reason as proposition 3, the principal
accepts the information loss for d 2 (0;d1) and d 2 (d2;1) under PW, while
SA is optimal if d 2 [0;d1) and SP is optimal if d 2 (d2;1). If the cost lies
in the middle of the range (d 2 (d1;d2)), power is optimal again. In contrast
to the no-competition cases, the nonpowerful manager has less incentive for
power struggle, as the nonpowerful manager faces the fear of competition over
resources if he or she engages in the power struggle; i.e.,
U2(e1;e2;bH;bH;w¤) ¡ U1(e1;e2;bH;bL;w¤) = Ip ¡ h: (18)
As w¤ satisﬁes both (PWC1) and (PWC2) for d 2 (d1;d2), the principal can















Figure 2: The implementation cost in each situation when h = 1
(¯ = 0:1, ¾ = 0:03, qH = 0:6, qL = 0:3, and c = 2)
Proposition 4. Suppose that power acquisition process is noncontractable and
competitive, and 1 < L(¾;¯). If h > 0 and d 2 (d1;d2), then power is optimal
for organizations.
Proof. Straightforward.
This beneﬁt is particularly important if there are many managers, as allowing
one manager’s struggle weakens all the other managers’ incentives for a power
struggle.
5.2 Negative Externality
Secondly, the principal’s negative externality is considered. The basic model fo-
cuses on the distortion of performance measures as the eﬀect of power. However,
the power struggle game can also aﬀect the eﬃciency of organizations directly.
Suppose that each manager has some inﬂuence on resources. The managers then
have to negotiate for the use of these resources. In SA, both managers establish
inﬂuence over diﬀerent resources and thus have to bargain for the mutual use of
the resource. In PW, the nonpowerful manager bargains for the use of the pow-
erful manager’s resources. This bargaining can cause a negative externality for
the principal in the form of a delay in decisions, the breakdown of bargaining,





K if l = SA ((b1;b2) = (bH;bH))
®K if l = PW ((b1;b2) = (bH;bL) or (bL;bH))
0 if l = SP ((b1;b2) = (bL;bL))
; (19)
where the negative externality K > 0 in SA and ® (1 > ® ¸ 0) represents the
diﬀerence of the negative externality between SA and PW. We assume that the
17resources are rich (Figure 1) and d · d1, and hence the principal bears the
information loss to prevent the manager from undertaking the power struggle.
The principal’s payoﬀ in each struggle situation is deﬁned by V (l) = EP(wl)+
K(l) for l 2 fSP;SA;PWg; i.e.,
V (SP) = EP(wSP) + K(SP) = EP(w¤) + K;
V (PW) = EP(wPW) + K(PW) = EP(w¤) + (L(¾;¯) + 1)Ip + ®K;















Figure 3: The implementation cost in each situation when K = 4
(¯ = 0:1, ¾ = 0:03, qH = 0:6, qL = 0:3, c = 2, and ® = 0:25)
V (l) is drawn in Figure 3. With the negative externality, the principal again
prefers power. Choosing the power relationship indirectly, the principal faces a
trade-oﬀ between the implementation cost and the negative externality; i.e.,
K(SA) > K(PW) ¸ K(SP); (20)
EP(wSA) · EP(wPW) · EP(wSP): (21)
PW is inferior to SA in respect of the implementation cost, as under PW, the
principal prevents one manager from undertaking the power struggle. How-
ever, it is superior to the struggle-accepted situation in respect of the negative
externality, as the resources with which they bargain are less with the emer-
gence of power. With SP, the emergence of power is superior in respect to the
implementation cost; i.e.,
EP(wSP) ¡ EP(wPW) = (L(¾;¯) ¡ 1)Ip;
because under PW the principal allows one manager to engage in the power
struggle, while SP requires the prevention of both managers’ struggle. On the
other hand, the emergence of power is inferior in respect to the negative ex-
ternality. Therefore, power is optimal if the cost of controlling both the power
relationship and the negative externality are moderate under PW.
18Proposition 5. Suppose that the power acquisition process is noncontractable,
d · d1 and 1 < L(¾;¯). If K 2 (0;¯(L(¾;¯) ¡ 1)Ie=®(1 ¡ qH)] and ® 2
[0;(L(¾;¯) ¡ 1)=2L(¾;¯)], then there exists d such that the power is optimal.
Proof. Suppose that d0 2 fd j V (SP) = V (PW)g and d00 2 fd j V (SA) =
V (PW)g. If d0 < d, V (PW) < V (SP) as V (PW) is decreasing with respect
to d. Similarly, if d < d00, V (PW) < V (SA) as dV (PW)=d(d) 6= dV (SA)=d(d).
Therefore, the conditions that there exists d such that the power is optimal
are that 0 < d00 < d1 and d0 < d00. By some computation, we obtain K 2
(0;¯(L ¡ 1)Ie=®(1 ¡ qH)] and ® 2 [0;(L(¾;¯) ¡ 1)=2L(¾;¯)].
Finally, we note a comparative analysis over ¯.
Corollary 3. Suppose that the power acquisition process is noncontractable,
d · d1 and 1 < L(¾;¯). As ¯ is larger, the principal is less likely to prefer
power.
This means that the larger ¯ is a poor outcome for the principal, as the
information loss from the distortion of the evaluation process is more serious. In
fact, the upper bound on K and ® for the optimality of power is decreasing with
respect to ¯. In contrast, the principal prefers power, as ¯ is larger when the
power acquisition process is contractable. This provides the signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between the contractable and noncontractable power acquisition processes.
6 Concluding remarks
We have speciﬁed the eﬀect of power on the evaluational process and examined
when power is preferable for the principal. Our analysis provides three cases:
(1) when the power acquisition process is contractable, (2) when the power
acquisition process is noncontractable and competitive, and (3) when the power
acquisition process is noncontractable and causes a negative externality to the
principal from bargaining for the use of resources.
We close this paper with a discussion of some possible extensions. In our
model, we assumed that managers are identical in that managers have an equal
ability in acquiring a source of power and performing productive action. It is,
however, also important to ask what kind of divisions are more likely to obtain
power. As divisions in an organization usually work on diﬀerent tasks, they will
diﬀer in their abilities in acquiring resources and engaging in productive action,
and in the relative importance of each division to the organization. How these
factors aﬀect the optimal power distribution in an organization is an interesting
future direction for our research.
Appendix
A Lemma 2
Let wSPv, wSAv, wPWv be an optimal compensation scheme under SP, SA, and
PW, respectively.
19Lemma 2. Suppose that the power acquisition process is contractable. The
optimal implementation cost in no emergence of power weakly exceeds that in
the struggle-free situation; i.e.,
EP(w¤) = EP(wSPv) · EP(wSAv):
Proof. The implementation cost under SP is equal to that in the struggle-free
situation as the optimization problems are the same. The optimization problem
under SA diﬀers from that under SP in that the managers engage in a power
struggle. This presents the possibility that (PCi) is binding. Substituting the
struggle-free solution w¤ into each manager’s utility function in the power strug-
gle situation, we obtain




These show that the principal must pay for the manager’s negative utility if
d 2 (
qLc
qH¡qL;1). Therefore, EP(w¤) · EP(wSAv).
B The Optimal Contracts Under A Noncontrac-
tual Power Acquisition Process
In this appendix, we derive an optimal contract and the implementation cost in
each struggle situation when the power acquisition process is noncontractable.
As the power struggle cost is modiﬁed, (SAC1) and (SAC2) become
¯(w1(GB) ¡ w1(BG)) ¸ d + h; (SAC1’)
¯(w2(BG) ¡ w2(GB)) ¸ d + h: (SAC2’)
Similarly, (PWC1) and (PWC2) becomes
¯(w1(GB) ¡ w1(BG)) ¸ d; (PWC1’)
¯(w2(BG) ¡ w2(GB)) · d + h: (PWC2’)




s:t Ui(eH;eH;bL;bL;wi) ¸ 0 for 8i (PC i)
U1(eH;eH;bL;bL;w1) ¸ U1(eL;eH;bL;bL;w1) (IC 1)
U2(eH;eH;bL;bL;w2) ¸ U2(eH;eL;bL;bL;w2) (IC 2)
wi(x) ¸ 0 for 8x 2 M; i = 1;2 (LLC)
(SPC1) and (SPC2),
or (SAC1’) and (SAC2’),
or (PWC1’) and (PWC2’)









Contract 1 (Struggle-Proof Situation). Given a struggle-proof situation, the















if d 2 (0;d2)
w¤ if d 2 [d2;1)
:
The implementation cost increases in comparison with the benchmark.
EP(wSP) =
½
EP(w¤) + 2L(¾;¯)Ip if d 2 (0;d2)
EP(w¤) if d 2 [d2;1)
Proof. For d 2 (d2;1), w¤ is optimal as it satisﬁes (SPC1) and (SPC2). We
thus consider d 2 [0;d2]. In this case, as w¤ violates (SPC1) and (SPC2), the
binding constraints are (IC1), (IC2), (SPC1) and (SPC2). Substituting (IC1)
















where 1w(BB) = 0 by the same reasoning as in the struggle-free situation. As
we can show that the coeﬃcient of w1(BG) is positive from qH > 1=2 and ¾ · 1,
w1(BG) = 0. From (IC1) and (SPC1), the optimal compensation to manager
1 is w1
SP. The optimal compensation to manager 2 is derived in the same way.
The implementation cost is obtained by substituting the optimal compensation
scheme into the objective function.
B.2 Struggle-Accepted Situation
Contract 2 (Struggle-Accepted Situation). Given a struggle-accepted situation,














if d 2 [d1;1)
:
The implementation cost increases in comparison with the benchmark; i.e.,
EP(wSA) =
(
EP(w¤) if d 2 (0;d1)
2
(1¡¾)qH(1¡qH)(d+h)
¯ if d 2 [d1;1)
:
Proof. For d 2 (0;d1), w¤ is optimal as it satisﬁes (PC1), (PC2), (SAC1’) and
(SAC2’). We thus consider d 2 [d1;1). In this case, (SAC1’) and (SAC2’) are
binding as w¤ violates (SAC1’) and (SAC2’). After ﬁnding an optimal compen-
sation scheme satisfying (SAC1’) and (SAC2’), we show that the compensation
scheme satisﬁes (PC1), (PC2), (IC1), and (IC2). Substituting (SAC1’) into the
principal’s payment function to manager 1, we obtain
EP 1(w) =(¾ + (1 ¡ ¾)qHqH)w1(GG) + 2(1 ¡ ¾)qH(1 ¡ qH)w1(BG)




21where w1(BB) = 0 by the same reasoning as in the struggle-free situation.
As the coeﬃcients of w1(BG) and w1(GG) are positive, we can show that
w1(BG) = 0, w1(GG) = 0 and w1(GB) = (d + h)=¯ from (SAC1’). We check
(IC1) and (PC1). Substituting wPW into (IC1), we obtain
U1(eH;eH;bH;bH;w1) ¡ U1(eL;eH;bH;bH;w1)
=
(1 ¡ ¾)(qH ¡ qL)(1 ¡ qH)
¯
(d ¡ d1) ¸ 0:
The last inequality holds when d 2 [d1;1). Then wPW satisﬁes (IC1). Substi-
tuting wPW into manager 1’s utility function, we obtain
(1 ¡ ¾)qH(1 ¡ qH)
¯
(d + h) ¡ d ¡ h ¡ c
¸









(1 ¡ ¾)qH(1 ¡ qH) ¡ ¯




Thus, (PC1) is satisﬁed. The optimal compensation to manager 2 is found in
the same way. The implementation cost in each case is obtained by substituting
the optimal compensation scheme into the objective function.
B.3 The Emergence of Power
Contract 3. Suppose that 1 < L(¾;¯). Given the emergence of power, the












qH¯ (Ip ¡ h); d+h
¯ ;0;0
´´
if d 2 (0;d1)







if d 2 [d2;1)
:





EP(w¤) + (L(¾;¯) + 1)(Ip ¡ h) if d 2 (0;d1)






(¡Ip) if d 2 [d2;1)
Proof. A solution in the optimization problem without (PWC1’) and (PWC2’)








· (d + h):
This implies that (PWC1’) is binding for d 2 (0;d1] and (PWC2’) is binding for
d 2 [d2;1). We consider three cases according to d.
22² d · d1
When d · d1, w1
¤ is optimal as it satisﬁes (PWC1’) and (PC1). We
thus ﬁnd the optimal compensation to manager 2. Substituting (IC2) and






+ (1 ¡ ¾)qHIe
¶
¡ (L(¾;¯) + 1)(d + h)
+





BB = 0 by the same reasoning as in the struggle-free situation. As
the coeﬃcient of w2
GB is positive, we can show w2
GG = (1¡qH)(Ip¡h)=qH¯,
w2
GB = 0, and w2






+ L(¾;¯)(Ip ¡ h) ¡ (d + h) ¡ c
¸
(1 ¡ ¾)qL(1 ¡ qH) ¡ ¯
(1 ¡ ¾)(1 ¡ qH)(qH ¡ qL)
¸ 0:
Therefore, wPW is optimal.
² d1 · d · d2
In this case, (PWC1’) and (PWC2’) are not binding. Therefore, w¤ is
optimal.
² d2 · d
When d2 · d, w2
¤ is optimal, as (PWC2’) and (PC2) are not binding. We
thus ﬁnd the optimal compensation to manager 1. Substituting (PWC1’)
into the objective function with respect to manager 1, we obtain
EP 1(w) =(¾ + (1 ¡ ¾)qHqH)w1(GG) + 2(1 ¡ ¾)qH(1 ¡ qH)w1(BG)




where w1(BB) = 0 by the same reasoning as in the struggle-free situation.
From the signs of the coeﬃcient of w1
GG, and w1
BG, we can show w1(GB) =
d















PW) = ((1 ¡ ¾)qH(1 ¡ qH) + ¯)
d
¯




¡ c ¸ 0:
Therefore, w1
PW is optimal.
The implementation cost in each case is obtained by substituting the optimal
compensation scheme into the objective function.
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